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We study the effects of trade orientation and human capital on total factor pro-
ductivity for a pooled cross-section, time-series sample of developed and devel-
oping countries. We first estimate total factor productivity from a parsimonious
specification of the aggregate production function involving output per worker,
capital per worker, and the labor force, both with and without the stock of hu-
man capital. Then we consider a number of potential determinants of total factor
productivity growth including several measures of trade orientation as well as a
measure of human capital. We find that a high degree of openness benefits total
factor productivity and that human capital contributes to total factor productiv-
ity only after our measure of openness passes some threshold level. Before that
threshold, increases in human capital actually depress total factor productivity. Fi-
nally, we also consider the issue of convergence of real GDP per worker and total
factor productivity, finding more evidence of convergence for the latter than for
the former.
21. Introduction
Growth theory, an area of study with a long and distinguished history, drifted
out of the mainstream of economics with the emergence of concern about short-run
stabilization issues. This trend has reversed as growth theory has moved back onto the
stage of macroeconomic analysis. This reemergence occurred partly in response to the
provision of comparable cross-country data by Summers and Heston but also in
recognition of the fact that small changes in economic growth, if sustainable, lead to
huge long-run effects. In other words, the welfare implications from understanding and
possibly affecting economic growth swamp the gains, if any, from short-run
stabilization programs.
One piece to the growth puzzle, and our major focus, is the role of external
factors in economic growth. Trade and exchange rate regimes interact with other
economic and non-economic factors to affect changes in real per capita income.1 Larger
trade implies greater openness that facilitates the economy’s adoption of more efficient
techniques of production, leading to faster growth of total factor productivity and,
hence, real per capita income. The expansion of exports relaxes the foreign exchange
constraint and allows for larger imports of key inputs in the production process.
Finally, improvements in the terms of trade can exogenously increase output.
The reemergence of growth theory as an important topic of investigation has also
refocused much of the debate toward how public policy can affect economic growth.
The standard neo-classical growth models [i.e., the descriptive growth model of Solow
(1956), the optimal growth model of Ramsey (1928), or the overlapping generations
model of Samuelson (1958), as well as their descendants] have been challenged by the
literature on endogenous growth. The neo-classical paradigm considers technological
                                                 
1 Mankiw (1995) and Ventura (1997) argue that the process of equalization of factor
prices internationally improves the substitutability of capital and labor, thus,
improving growth prospects.
3change as an exogenous process whereas the endogenous growth literature makes this
process endogenous, looking for possible driving forces.
Mankiw (1995) provides a recent, clearly articulated discussion of the practical
empirical problems associated with the neo-classical approach along with a proposed
solution. Mankiw (1995) avers that the neo-classical model has problems addressing at
least three empirical regularities. To wit, the model cannot explain the observed
differences in real income per capita across countries, the observed rate of convergence
across countries, or the observed differences in real rates of return across countries. He
modifies one parameter, the returns to capital, by defining capital to include both
physical and human capital, and argues that this one change goes a long way toward
allowing the neo-classical model to explain these three empirical regularities.2
Economists, at least since the time of Solow (1957), explain output growth in
terms of the accumulation of factor inputs and of the growth of total factor
productivity. The explosion of growth accounting regressions in the last decade or so
has commonly searched for additional determinants of growth beyond the basic factors
of production. In effect, these studies treat all possible determinants of output growth
as inputs. Such an approach may be conceptually inaccurate, since many of the
included determinants may have only indirect effects on output. Rather, these
determinants affect the efficiency of the real inputs, physical capital, labor, and possibly
human capital. Consequently, these additional determinants of output growth directly
affect total factor productivity.
An important assumption in Mankiw’s (1995) analysis of neo-classical growth
theory, for example, is that human capital enters the production function along with
labor and physical capital. An alternative view might argue that physical capital
                                                 
2 Romer (1995), a leading proponent of endogenous growth theory, disagrees strongly
with Mankiw’s conclusion that changing the capital share rescues the neo-classical
model.
4contains mixes of different vintages and that human capital contains mixes of different
skills. Measures of human capital attempt to reflect the skill mix within a country,
recognizing that such measures are typically crude indices of the average level of
education or training. To our knowledge, no comparable measure of the technology
base that reflects the mix of capital vintages exists. Moreover, we can argue that the
vintage mix of capital and the skill mix of labor reflect the existing stock of
technological advantage extant within a given country’s economy. As such, we should
logically look for the effect of human capital on total factor productivity growth rather
than include it directly into the production function. An agnostic approach, which we
adopt, examines both possibilities for the effect of human capital on the growth process.
Our analysis evolves in two steps. First, we calculate two measures of total factor
productivity derived from production function specifications that exclude and include
our measure of human capital as an input. Second, we search for significant
determinants of total factor productivity, especially measures of trade and openness.
While the existing literature has identified total factor productivity to be large and
significant, much less work exists that searches for the determinants of total factor
productivity. We add some depth to this latter discussion.
The neo-classical models also imply some form of convergence in real income
per capita. Absolute convergence tests whether real income per capita converges to a
steady state value, irrespective of other conditions within a given country. Conditional
convergence, on the other hand, allows each country to have a different level of real
income per capita toward which it is converging. Differences in steady-state values of
real per capita income across countries reflect differences in such factors as the saving
rate, the population growth rate, and so on. We test for convergence both in real income
per capita and in total factor productivity.
We can state our basic findings simply. First, human capital has a significant
effect on output when it is included as a factor of production. The incorporation of
5human capital in the production function lowers the elasticity of output with respect to
labor when compared to the production function without human capital as an input.
The elasticity of output with respect to physical capital remains essentially unaltered by
the introduction of human capital as an input.
Second, we find that one measure of the openness of an economy [the ratio of
exports to gross domestic product (GDP)] has a significant positive effect on total factor
productivity. Further, human capital interacts significantly with openness in this case to
affect total factor productivity. Human capital has a positive effect on total factor
productivity only if openness exceeds a threshold value. If openness falls below this
threshold value, then human capital has a negative effect on total factor productivity.
Finally, we find evidence of absolute convergence in real GDP per capita only
for the OECD countries in our sample, a finding consistent with the existing literature.
But we also discover evidence of absolute convergence of total factor productivity for
the whole sample of developed and developing countries.3 That is, the convergence of
total factor productivity does not hinge on the relative position of a given country, as is
the case for real GDP per capita (i.e., conditional convergence).
Our paper progresses as follows. In the next section, we estimate parsimonious
production functions and determine the levels of total factor productivity under two
specifications -- one with and one without the stock of human capital as an input. In
section 3, we report the results of tests for convergence of real GDP per capita and of
total factor productivity. We search for various determinants of total factor productivity
in section 4. Finally, we conclude in section 5.
2. Estimates of the Production Function and Total Factor Productivity
                                                 
3 Despite evidence of absolute convergence, we do not detect much support for a
narrowing of the spread of income distribution over time, except for the sub-sample of
high-income countries.
6The measurement of total factor productivity requires the estimation of a
production function from which we derive the total factor productivity measure. To
keep the analysis simple, we adopt, as a first approximation, the Cobb-Douglas
production function. Thus, our two production functions, one excluding and one
including the stock of human capital, are expressed as follows:
(1) Y = A Ka Lb, 0 < a < 1 and 0 < b < 1, and
(2) Y = A Ka Hg Lb, 0 < a < 1, 0 < g < 1, and 0 < b < 1,
where Y equals real GDP, K equals the total physical capital stock, L equals the number
of workers (labor force), H equals our measure of human capital, and A equals an index
of total factor productivity. We allow for the possibility of non-constant returns to scale
by not restricting (a + b) or (a + b + g) to equal one.
Dividing equations (1) and (2) by the labor force (L) expresses output, the
physical capital stock, and the human capital stock on a per worker basis. That is,
(3) y = A ka La+b-1, and
(4) y = A ka hg La+b+g-1,
where y equals real GDP per worker, k equals the per worker stock of physical capital,
and h equals the per worker stock of human capital. These production functions display
increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale as (a + b) or (a + b + g) are greater
than, equal to, or less than one, respectively.
Rewriting equations (3) and (4) in natural logarithms yields the following:
(5) lny = lnA + a lnk + (a + b - 1) lnL, and
(6) lny = lnA + a lnk +g lnh + (a + b + g - 1) lnL.
Thus, the tests for constant returns to scale involve whether the coefficient of lnL equals
zero.
The inclusion of human capital as an input in the production function is
controversial. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) advocate such an approach on both
theoretical and empirical grounds, and obtain a better fit after including human capital
7in their cross-section regressions. Islam (1995), using panel regressions, finds that
human capital does not contribute significantly to explaining output in the Mankiw-
Romer-Weil specification. He does suggest that human capital significantly affects total
factor productivity, but leaves a more definitive statement for future research.
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) also incorporate human capital into a logarithmic-
differenced (i.e., growth-rate) estimation of the production function. They discover
insignificant or negative coefficients for the human capital variable (i.e., the growth rate
of human capital). This finding leads them to consider more complex paths (i.e.,
through interaction terms) whereby human capital affects growth. They conclude that
human capital does not enter the production function as an input, but rather influences
growth through its effect on total factor productivity.
We use, as does Islam (1995), panel data to estimate the production function. Our
data cover the 1960 to 1989 time period (1959 to 1989 for any growth rate) for a sample
of 83 countries. The following regions are represented in our data set : Africa (19
countries), Caribbean, Central America, and North America (13), South America (11),
Asia (16), Europe (20), and Oceania (4). The Data Appendix, Table A, lists the countries
included in our sample. Data availability limited the country sample. Our panel
combines data in five-year blocks as follows: 1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-
84, and 1985-89. Usually, the data are averages of the five years in each block.
The data for estimating the production function come largely from the Summers
and Heston Penn World Table 5.6 (PWT5.6). The output measure is real GDP per
worker (1985 international prices) averaged over five-year blocks. The labor force is
derived from the reported data on real GDP per capita, real GDP per worker, and
population. The labor force is also averaged over five-year blocks. The physical capital
stock per worker was not available for all years in all countries. Thus, to keep from
losing too many countries in the panel, we estimated the capital stock from investment
flow data and some benchmark stocks of physical capital. (See the Data Appendix for
8details.) Finally, the stock of human capital is based on the average years of schooling
per adult reported by NBER/Barro and Lee (1994). (See the Appendix for details.) Due
to data availability, we measure the stock of human capital at the beginning of each
five-year period rather than an average over the period (i.e., 1960 for the 1960-64 time
period).
Our data encompasses 498 observations (83 countries and 6 time blocks). Our
estimating equations emerge by adding random errors to equations (5) and (6). These
error terms incorporate the effects of omitted variables. Classical regression analysis
assumes that the omitted variables are independent of the included right-hand-side
variables and are independently, identically distributed.
When using panel data, however, we can further classify the omitted variables
into three groups -- country-varying time-invariant, time-varying country-invariant,
and country- and time-varying variables.4 The country-varying time-invariant variables
differ across countries, but are constant within a country over time. Examples include a
country’s geography, location, or climate. The time-varying country-invariant variables
differ over time, but are constant at a point in time across countries. Examples here
include worldwide business cycle events or technological shocks. Finally, country- and
time-varying variables differ across both countries and time.
The estimation of equations (5) and (6) without consideration of possible
country-specific or time-specific effects can generate misleading results for ordinary-
least-squares regressions. Hsiao (1986) provides examples of misleading results.
Problems emerge when either the unobservable country-specific or time-specific
variables correlate with the included right-hand-side variables. Two alternative, but
related, procedures exist for addressing these problems -- fixed-effect and random-
effect models. We restrict our attention to fixed-effect estimation since the random-
                                                 
4 Our discussion of panel estimation relies heavily on Hsiao (1986) and Greene (1990).
9effects estimation requires that the omitted variables are uncorrelated with the included
right-hand-side variables -- an unrealistic assumption in the context of our model.
Suppose that the problem is the omission of country-specific variables that
correlate with the included right-hand-side variables. A solution to this problem
adjusts the dependent and independent variables by subtracting the mean of each
variable over time.5 Since the unobserved country-specific variables and the intercept
do not change over time, the subtraction of their respective means over time drops
these variables out of the regression equations. If this is the only problem with
equations (5) and (6), then the regression adjusted for means across time provides
unbiased and consistent estimates of the coefficients. Without adjustment, ordinary-
least-squares produces biased and inconsistent estimates.
If the problem is time-specific variables that are correlated with the included
right-hand-side variables, a similar solution adjusts the dependent and independent
variables by subtracting the mean of each variable over countries. Since each country
faces the same time-specific effects, subtracting the mean over countries drops the
intercept and the time-specific effects out of the revised regression equations. Once
again, the revised regression equations provide unbiased and consistent estimates.
Of course, it is possible that both country-and time-specific effects correlate with
the included right-hand-side variables. In this case, we can adjust for the means over
countries and time. We adopt this last approach and consider fixed effects over
countries and time. Our problem, however, has few elements in the time dimension.
Thus, rather than adjusting the data as deviations from the mean across countries, we
include time-specific dummy variables (i.e., six dummy variables for the six time
                                                 
5 An alternative procedure estimates a first-differenced regression. Lagging equations
(5) and (6) by one period and subtracting the lagged equation from the unlagged
counterpart causes the intercept and the country-specific terms to drop out. Benhabib
and Spiegel (1994) estimate a logarithmic differenced production function which
matches the fixed-effect estimation over the two time periods in their sample.
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periods). We still adjust the data as deviations from the means over time within each
country rather than include country-specific dummy variables, which would
necessitate 83 additional variables.
The estimated equations are as follows:6
(7) lny = lnA + a lnk + (a + b - 1) lnL, + 
i=å 1
6
 qi timei + et and
(8) lny = lnA + a lnk +g lnh + (a + b + g - 1) lnL , + 
i=å 1
6
 qI timei + et,
where timei (i = 1, ..., 6) represent the time dummy variables and the variables for each
country measure deviations from their country means over time. We then calculate the
country-specific fixed effects of intercepts (cintj) as follows:
(9) cintj = lnyj - $a lnk j - $d 1 lnL j and
(10) cintj = lnyj - $a lnk j - $g lnhj - $d 2 lnL j ,
where “-” over a variable means the mean of that variable, “^” over a parameter means
the estimate of that parameter, d1 = (a + b - 1), d2 = (a + b + g -1), and j = {1,2,3,...,83} is
the index across countries. Note that the time-specific fixed effects appear directly as
the respective coefficients of the time dummy variables.
Table 1 reports the estimates of equations (7) and (8) as well as two
modifications of equation (7). Column one gives the estimate of equation (7). The
coefficient of ln L (i.e., -0.0988), although only significant at the 20-percent level,
indicates that the production function exhibits slightly decreasing returns to scale. The
coefficient of ln k assigns a value of 0.4756 to the elasticity of output with respect to the
physical capital stock. These two coefficients combine to generate the implied elasticity
of output with respect to the labor force of 0.4256. Thus, after accounting for country-
                                                 
6 The estimation of an aggregate production function confronts the researcher with
numerous problems. One major concern is the possible endogeneity of physical and
human capital ,since these factors are accumulated over time. Benhabib and Spiegel
(1994) examine this issue and conclude that the coefficients of physical and human
capital probably over-estimate their effects while the coefficient of labor probably
under-estimate its effect. The reader needs to keep these potential biases in mind when
interpreting our findings.
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and time-specific effects, the output elasticities with respect to labor and physical
capital sum to a value of 0.9012.
Column two in Table 1 reports the estimates of equation (8), where our measure
of the stock of human capital per worker in logarithmic form enters the production
function.7 Now, the output elasticity with respect to human capital equals 0.1136, which
is significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level. The output elasticity with
respect to physical capital remains essentially unchanged from the specification
without human capital at 0.4712. The combined elasticity of output with respect to
physical and human capital totals 0.5848, a result not too far from the findings of
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). The implied elasticity of output with respect to the
labor force falls to 0.2769, suggesting that the coefficient of labor in the specification
without human capital captures much of the influence of human capital. In sum, our
results on the effect of human capital in the production function support the findings of
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and differ from those of Islam (1995) and Benhabib
and Spiegel (1994).
An alternative method of incorporating human capital into estimates of the
production function allows for the interaction of human capital with either physical
capital or the labor force.8 That is, changes in human capital affect either the elasticity of
output with respect to physical capital or the labor force. Column three of Table 1
reports the results of interacting the stock of human capital with the stock of physical
capital per worker while column four, human capital and the labor force. The elasticity
of output with respect to physical capital is significantly affected by the stock of human
                                                 
7In fact, we measure the stock of human capital as the average years of schooling per
adult. We assume that the variable provides a good proxy for the average years of
schooling per worker.
8 To calculate the total stock of human capital, we multiply our measure of human
capital (i.e., average years of schooling per worker) times the number of workers to get
the average years of schooling in the labor force.
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capital; the elasticity of output with respect to labor is not. So, once again, we find
evidence suggesting a link between human and physical capital rather than human
capital and the labor force.
The time-specific dummy variables tell a consistent story. That is, total factor
productivity increases over each five-year time span, beginning in 1960-64 and ending
in 1975-79. The last two time spans -- 1980-84 and 1985-89 -- suggest a stagnation in
total factor productivity growth.
We employ the estimates of equations (7) and (8) (i.e., columns one and two in
Table 1) to produce total factor productivity estimates for each country across the six
time blocks. Table A in the Appendix reports the ranking of the 83 countries for our
two different estimates of total factor productivity averaged across the six time blocks.
These two sets of rankings possess a rank correlation of 0.9761, indicating a consistent
pattern of country rankings across the two different estimates of total factor
productivity. Moreover, the correlation between our two measures of total factor
productivity and real GDP per worker equals 0.68 and 0.60 for the measures that
exclude and include human capital in the production function, respectively.
3. Convergence Tests
A large literature tests for the convergence of real income per capita, beginning
with Baumol (1986) and extending through Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), and
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). The Economic Journal (1996) published a symposium
discussing the “Controversy on the Convergence and Divergence of Growth Rates.” In
this symposium, Sala-i-Martin (1996) defends the traditional cross-section regression
method of investigating convergence. Quah (1996) presents a strong critique of this
traditional approach, arguing in favor of examining the distribution of real income per
capita over time. In another critique, Bernard and Jones (1996) argue that the traditional
approach over-stresses the role of capital accumulation and ignores or under-
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emphasizes the importance of technological diffusion in understanding convergence or
divergence issues.
We test for the convergence of real GDP per worker as well as for the
convergence of total factor productivity. The tests for convergence of total factor
productivity provide some new insight as to the spread, adoption, and convergence of
technological advances. As such, our tests offer some insight into the questions raised
by Bernard and Jones (1996). Finally, our tests also may shed some light on the
argument about whether technology is a public or a private good. That is, if technology
is a public good that can speedily transit international boundaries, then we should find
convergence of total factor productivity.
The neo-classical growth models each imply convergence of real income per
worker. The various empirical tests for convergence fall under two categories -- tests of
unconditional (absolute) or conditional convergence. Unconditional convergence means
that each country moves toward the same steady-state real GDP per worker.
Conditional convergence suggests that each country possesses its own steady state real
GDP per worker to which it is converging. The steady state in each country is
conditioned on the state of its economy. For example, the Solow (1956) growth model
implies that the steady-state real GDP per worker across countries depends on the
saving and population growth rates in each country.
Two types of convergence exist in the literature -- b-convergence and s-
convergence. Convergence of the b-type considers whether the growth rates of
countries exhibit a negative correlation with the level of real GDP per worker. That is, b
-convergence implies that countries with low real GDP per worker possess faster
growth rates than countries with high real GDP per worker. Convergence of the s-type
considers whether the dispersion of real GDP per worker diminishes over time. That is, 
s-convergence implies that the distribution of real GDP per worker across countries
gets tighter over time, thus reducing some measure of dispersion.
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Tests for b-convergence regress the growth rate of real GDP per worker onto the
initial value of real GDP per worker to test for absolute convergence and onto the initial
value of real GDP per worker and other control variables (e.g., investment to GDP) to
test for conditional convergence. Tests for s-convergence consider the movement of a
measure of dispersion of real GDP per worker over time. As such, s-convergence must
of necessity measure absolute convergence. For example, if all countries have the
identical level of steady-state real GDP per worker, then s-convergence implies that the
measure of dispersion approaches zero over time. On the other hand, if all countries
have different levels of steady-state real GDP per worker, then the dispersion of steady-
state real GDP per worker must represent the steady-state level of dispersion to which
real GDP per worker is converging. That is, s-convergence in this case implies that the
measure of dispersion approaches the steady-state dispersion of real GDP per worker.
As a result, if the measure of dispersion is below its steady-state level, then
convergence implies a rising, not falling, measure of dispersion.
Empirical studies of b-convergence typically find evidence of absolute
convergence only for samples of developed (OECD) countries. Samples that include
both developing and developed countries or samples that include only developing
countries typically do not exhibit evidence of absolute convergence. Evidence of
conditional convergence, however, does frequently emerge in samples that include
both developing and developed countries. Empirical tests of s-convergence are much
fewer (e.g., Friedman 1992 and Sala-i-Martin 1996). Nonetheless, they tell a similar
story as that associated with absolute convergence, which we might expect.9
                                                 
9 Quah (1996) argues that this increased emphasis on s-convergence still misses the
point of whether “... poor countries are catching up with rich countries” (p. 1053). Quah
(1996) also provides a discussion of his alternative views on economic growth and
convergence.
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We first test for absolute b-convergence in two ways -- a cross-section test and a
pooled cross-section, time-series test. All regressions of absolute convergence have the
following form:
(11) gyt = ln yt - ln yt-1 = a + by ln yt-1 + eyt,
where gyt is the growth rate of real GDP per worker from (t-1) to t (approximated by
the logarithmic difference), yt-1 is the level of real GDP per worker in (t-1), and eyt is the
random error We calculate the growth rates and levels of real GDP per worker using
the average levels of real GDP per worker in each time block of five years. That is, we
have average levels of real GDP per worker in 1960-64, 1965-69, ... , and 1985-89 for
each country. The growth rate for the cross-section test calculates gyt as the logarithmic
difference between real GDP per worker in 1985-89 and 1960-64 divided by 25 and the
lagged logarithm of real GDP per worker is for 1960-64 (i.e., the initial time period in
the cross-section test).10 The growth rates for the pooled cross-section, time-series tests
calculate gyt as the logarithmic difference of real GDP per worker between 1965-69 and
1960-64, between 1970-74 and 1965-69, ... , and between 1985-89 and 1980-84, each
divided by 5; and the corresponding lagged logarithms of real GDP per worker are for
1960-64, 1965-69, ... , and 1980-84.11
Similar regressions are performed where total factor productivity replaces real
GDP per worker. That is, the regressions for b-convergence of total factor productivity
have the following form:
(12) gtfpt = ln tfpt - ln tfpt-1 = a + btfp ln tfpt-1 + etfpt,
                                                 
10 We divide the logarithmic difference between real GDP per worker in 1985-89 and
1960-64 by 25 to approximate the annual growth rate between 1962 and 1987, the two
mid-points of the 1960-64 and 1985-89 periods, respectively.
11 Now, the logarithmic difference between real GDP per worker in 1965-69 and 1960-
64 implies a five-year difference between the mid-points of the two five-year time
blocks (i.e., 1962 and 1967, respectively).
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where tfp equals total factor productivity. The same construction of variables for the
growth rates and lagged logarithms hold as described for real GDP per worker in the
prior paragraph.12
Finally, the pooled cross-section, time-series regressions were implemented
using the fixed-effect technique that we applied to the estimation of the production
functions in the previous section. All variables in each country were constructed as
deviations from the means over time. And we included time dummy variables to
capture the time fixed effects in our pooled cross-section, time-series regressions. Since
the regressions involve growth rates, we lose 83 observations (one for each country) in
our pooled cross-section, time-series regressions.
The results of our b-convergence tests appear in the top part of Table 2. Several
items deserve mention. The pure cross-section test for b-convergence of real GDP per
worker (row 1 in Table 2) tells a story consistent with the existing literature. That is, no
evidence exists of b-convergence for the whole sample of 83 countries or for the two
sub-samples of the 22 low-income countries or the 38 middle-income countries.13
Evidence exists of b-convergence at the 10-percent level for the high-income countries
only.
                                                 
12 We conduct tests of equation (12) for our two measures of total factor productivity --
measures that exclude and include the stock of human capital in the first-stage
production function estimation.
13 We divided our sample into low-, middle-, and high-income countries based on real
GDP per worker in the 1960-64 period. The World Bank divides countries into low-,
middle-, and high-income countries based on real GDP per capita. Using a number in
the range of 2 to 2.5 to measure the ratio of population to the number of workers, we
convert these ranges into ranges based on real GDP per worker. Low-income countries
had an average income for 1960-64 below $3,000 per worker; middle-income countries,
between $3,000 and $10,000 per worker; and high-income countries, above $10,000 per
worker.
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A slightly different story emerges for the cross-section b-convergence tests for
total factor productivity (row 2 in Table 2).14 Here, evidence of b-convergence of total
factor productivity exists for the full sample of countries as well as for each sub-sample
of low-, middle-, and high-income countries. The evidence for b-convergence
strengthens as the focus moves from low-income countries (significant at the 20-percent
level) to middle-income countries (significant at the 10-percent level) to high-income
countries (significant at the 1-percent level). In addition, the b coefficient is negative
and significant at the 1-percent level for the full sample.
What do these results tell us? To the extent that our measure of total factor
productivity captures the technological character of the production process, these
convergence findings suggest more evidence of convergence of technology than real
GDP per worker. Of course, as noted above, the neoclassical growth models do not
imply unconditional convergence of real GDP per worker, since differences in
economic conditions (e.g., savings rates and population growth rates) lead to different
steady states. No similar argument, to our knowledge, applies to the convergence of
technology. Rather convergence in total factor productivity associates with the view
that technology is a public good while non-convergence associates with technology as a
private good.15 As a result, the stronger findings for the convergence of technology may
indicate that the public-good nature of technology dominates any private-good
dimension.
                                                 
14 We report only the results for the total factor productivity measure that excludes the
stock of human capital in the first-stage production function estimation. The results for
our second measure of total factor productivity mirrors closely the reported results.
These additional results are available on request.
15 In fact, non-convergence can associate with technology that is a public good, if the
high-income innovative countries discover new technology at a rate faster than the
diffusion and adoption of old technology by the poorer countries.
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We also test for b-convergence using our pooled cross-section, time-series data
set.16 In general, the findings of b-convergence are strengthened when compared to the
single cross-section results reported in the previous paragraphs. The panel tests for b-
convergence of real GDP per worker (row 3 in Table 2) indicate significant evidence of
convergence for the full sample at the 1-percent level unlike the insignificant findings
for the single cross-section. Similarly, we now uncover evidence of b-convergence of
real GDP per worker for the low-, middle-, and high-income groups at the 20-, 1-, and
1-percent levels, respectively.
How might such differences in findings emerge? First, the panel data tests allow
for each country's growth rate to respond to changes in its level of real GDP per worker
accomplished over prior five-year periods. For example, a country with low income
may experience rapid growth in accordance with the convergence hypothesis. To the
extent that this country closes the gap on high-income countries, then the convergence
hypothesis suggests that its growth rate should slow. The panel data estimates
facilitates such scenarios whereas the single cross-section regression rules them out.
That is, in  single cross-section regression, a country's growth rate averaged over the
entire period is linked to its initial real GDP per worker.
Second, the panel data approach controls for country and time fixed effects. To
the extent that this method accommodates differences across countries and time, the
test actually transforms into a test of conditional convergence, conditional on those
fixed effects across countries and time. As such, finding more evidence of convergence
in the panel estimation appears reasonable.
                                                 
16 Islam (1995) provides similar tests for b-convergence using panel data constructed
with time periods of five-year duration. Miller (1996) and Miller and Russek (1997) test
for b-convergence using panel data where each year is a separate entry in the panel.
Miller and Russek (1996) test for b-convergence across the states in the United States
using panel data also where each year is a separate entry in the panel.
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Similar results emerge for the b-convergence tests for total factor productivity
(row 4 of Table 2). The panel results indicate more support for convergence than found
in the single cross-section results with one exception. Now, the panel results suggest
weaker evidence of convergence in total factor productivity for the high-income
countries. That is, all results are significant at the 1-percent level except for the high-
income countries where the significance level is 20-percent. Moreover, the b-
convergence test is not significant for the high-income countries when we use the other
measure of total factor productivity (not reported).
The weak or no finding for convergence of total factor productivity for the panel
data regressions in the high-income countries may reflect to some extent the arguments
of Bernard and Jones (1996). That is, if we argue that technological advance occurs in
the high-income countries as a rule and that technology flows from the technological
innovators to the other countries, then we may expect convergence in total factor
productivity among those countries who are adopting existing technology, but no
convergence among the innovators. Our findings are consistent with this story.
Our results for s-convergence appear in the bottom part of Table 2. Our measure
of s-convergence is the standard deviation of real GDP per worker or total factor
productivity over the five-year sub-periods. Once again, several observations deserve
mention. The s-convergence of real GDP per worker provides little evidence of
convergence. The standard deviation tends to increase over the six five-year sub-
periods for the full sample of countries as well as for the low-income and middle-
income samples. We do observe a declining standard deviation for the high-income
country sample. But even here, the standard deviation increases in the 1980s. In
addition, the upward movement in the standard deviation of real GDP per worker for
the whole sample and for the samples of low-income and middle-income countries also
rises more dramatically during the 1980s.
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The s-convergence of total factor productivity deviates somewhat from the
findings for real GDP per worker.17 Now, the standard deviation of total factor
productivity declines gradually for the full sample to 1980-84 before rising in 1985-89.
Also, the decline in this standard deviation is monotonic for the high-income countries.
Low-income countries saw the standard deviation of total factor productivity falling
through 1975-79 and increasing thereafter while the standard deviation for the middle-
income countries was fairly stable until increasing in the 1980s.
Quah (1996) argues strenuously that the convergence debate misses the point --
that is, the churning of the income distribution among countries over time. He suggests
that evidence exists of convergence toward twin peaks or of convergence clubs. To
examine this issue, we arrange countries by income into 8 groups and plot the number
of countries in each group versus income in each time period.18 This provides a rough-
and-ready method of looking for twin peaks or convergence clubs. We observe a single-
peaked distribution in 1960-64 that becomes triple-peaked in 1965-69 at low-, middle-,
and high-income levels. The picture reverts to a single peak in 1970-74, 1975-79, and
1980-84 before shifting to twin peaks at reasonably high income levels in 1985-89. Thus,
multiple clustering of countries at different parts of the income scale occurs on some
occasions, but the clustering is by no means systematic.19
In sum, our analysis of convergence uncovers few surprises. Several new
observations do emerge, however. We find stronger evidence of convergence of total
factor productivity than of real GDP per worker. In addition, we discover strong
                                                 
17 Although unreported, similar findings emerge for our other measure of total factor
productivity that includes the stock of human capital in the first-stage production
function estimation. These results are available on request.
18 The income ranges expressed in the logarithm of real GDP per worker extend from
6.5 to 10.5 in increments of 0.5.
19 Quah (1996) provides a thorough discussion of the twin peaks or convergence clubs
ideas. Charts of the distribution of countries by income is available to interested readers
on request.
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evidence of convergence of total factor productivity for low- and middle-income
countries, but weak evidence for high-income countries.
4. Determinants of Total Factor Productivity
This section studies the role of trade-related variables and other factors in
influencing total factor productivity. We derived two different measures of total factor
productivity in section 2 based on estimated production functions that exclude and
include our measure of the stock of human capital. Our estimating equation takes the
following form:
(13) ln tfp = a1 + a2 ln H + a3 ln x + a4 ln tot + a5 ln pd + a6 ln (1+p)




a10+i timei + e,
where x equals the ratio of exports to GDP,20 tot equals the terms of trade, pd equals
local price deviation from purchasing power parity, p equals the inflation rate, and si
equals the standard deviation of i (= x, tot, pd, and p) over the five-year sub-periods.
Details on the variables are contained in the Data Appendix.
We estimate equation (13) using the fixed-effect method where each variable in
each country is measured as a deviation from its mean over time. In addition, we
include time dummy variables to capture fixed effects over time. Table 3 reports the
results of our estimates of equation (13). Columns 1 and 3 report the estimates of
equation (13) where the dependent variable is the total factor productivity variable that
excludes and includes the stock of human capital in the first-stage production function
regressions, respectively.
Taken together, the trade variables tell a cumulative, consistent story. The
export-to-GDP ratio has a significant positive effect at the 1-percent level. A more open
economy, other things equal, associates with higher total factor productivity. The local
                                                 
20 We also examined regression results where we used imports plus exports to GDP
rather than just exports to GDP. The export-to-GDP ratio performed better.
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price deviations from purchasing power parity has a significant negative effect at the 5-
percent level. Here, larger deviations from purchasing power parity associate with
lower total factor productivity. To the extent that local deviations from purchasing
power parity imply a more-restricted, less-open domestic economy, then the coefficient
on this variable captures another aspect of the openness of the economy to trade,
reinforcing our finding on the export-to-GDP ratio. The terms of trade variable has a
positive effect, but it is only significant at the 20-percent level. So improvements in the
terms of trade weakly associate with higher total factor productivity.
The inflation rate has a significant negative effect on total factor productivity at
the 1-percent level. This finding that higher inflation associates with lower total factor
productivity may offer an explanation for the observed empirical regularity between
higher inflation and lower economic growth.21 That is, higher inflation leads to lower
economic growth through inflation’s effect on total factor productivity.
The standard deviation variables have, on average, much less significance in
explaining total factor productivity. The one exception, the standard deviation of
exports to GDP, has a significant negative effect at the 1-percent level. That is, the less
variable and more stable the export-to-GDP ratio, the higher is total factor productivity.
In sum, a higher and more stable export-to-GDP ratio, a lower inflation rate, and
less local price deviation from purchasing power parity associate with higher total
factor productivity. At the margin, improving the terms of trade also may lead to
higher total factor productivity.
We also note that the specification in equation (13) leads to a stock of human
capital variable that is insignificant in column 1 and significant at the 20-percent level
and negative in column 3. These results are consistent with the findings of many
                                                 
21 While Levin and Renelt (1992) find that the effect of inflation on economic growth is
fragile, they do find that it is consistently negative. Kormendi and Meguire (1985),
Grier and Tullock (1989), and Miller and Russek (1997) report evidence of a negative
effect of inflation on economic growth.
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researchers. These researchers, however, generally examine the effect of human capital
on growth rather than on total factor productivity. Islam (1995) and Benhabib and
Spiegel (1994) suggest that human capital may affect growth indirectly through total
factor productivity.
Finally, as we also observed in the production function estimations, a significant
pattern emerges in the time fixed effects. Total factor productivity grows
monotonically, other things constant, from 1960-64 through 1975-79. Then it levels off
and/or falls somewhat in the 1980s.
Human Capital-Trade Openness Interaction
Another possible avenue through which human capital affects total factor
productivity is its interaction with trade orientation.22 Greater openness fosters
competition, encourages the use of modern technology, increases the demand for high-
skilled labor, and promotes learning by doing.23
Columns 2 and 4 in Table 3 add the interaction term of human capital and the
export-to-GDP ratio. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant at
the 5- and 10-percent levels for the total factor productivity measure that excludes and
includes the stock of human capital in the first-stage production function regressions,
respectively. Clearly, the effect of the ratio of exports to GDP on total factor
productivity remain significant and positive [i.e., both coefficients of (ln x) and (ln H ln
x) are positive]. Now, however, the effect of openness is leveraged by the stock of
human capital -- more human capital implies a larger effect of openness on total factor
productivity.
                                                 
22 Grossman and Helpman (1991) suggest that increased trade orientation may interact
with human capital to produce higher output growth. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994)
interact human capital with other variables including technological progress.
23 Leamer (1995), among many others, claims that increased foreign trade of the United
States has led to an increase in the real wage of skilled workers  and a corresponding
reduction in the real wage of unskilled workers.
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The effect of the stock of human capital on total factor productivity becomes
conditioned on the level of exports to GDP. For low levels of openness (i.e., exports to
GDP), the coefficient on the stock of human capital, which is negative, dominates the
positive coefficient on the interaction between openness and human capital. For large
levels of openness, this effect of human capital on total factor productivity reverses and
becomes positive, since the interaction term dominates the isolated effect of human
capital.
We can calculate the level of exports to GDP at which the total effect of the stock
of human capital on total factor productivity reverses sign. For the regression results
reported in column 2 of Table 3, this reversal occurs when exports to GDP reaches
about 11 percent. The level rises to about 50 percent in the results reported in column 4.
We note that the results reported in column 4 already incorporate the effect of the stock
of human capital on total factor productivity through the inclusion of human capital in
the first-stage production function estimation. Thus, the level of openness at which
human capital begins to have a positive effect on total factor productivity rises
significantly from 11 to
50 percent.
This finding possesses intuitive appeal. To wit, as noted previously, greater
openness fosters competition, encourages the use of modern technology, increases the
demand for high-skilled labor, and promotes learning by doing. Too little openness,
therefore, does not allow a country to leverage its stock of human capital. In other
words, the investment in human capital absent liberalization of the external sector may
lead to the under-utilization of human capital.24
                                                 
24 Upadhyay (1994, 1997) provides a theoretical discussion of (1) large education
subsidies that cause a rapid human capital expansion at the cost of expanding physical
capital, and (2) the effect of public-sector schemes to employ human capital, frequently
for reasons of political economy rather than public goods, that we observe in many
countries in Africa or Asia.
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Finally, we also note that the inclusion of the human capital and openness
interaction term does not have significant effects on the magnitudes, signs, and
significance of the other variables in the total factor productivity regressions.
5. Conclusion
We study the effects of trade orientation and human capital on total factor
productivity for a pooled cross-section, time-series sample of developed and
developing countries. We first estimate total factor productivity from a parsimonious
specification of the aggregate production function involving output per worker, capital
per worker, and the labor force, both with and without the stock of human capital. We
next consider the issue of unconditional convergence for real GDP per worker and for
total factor productivity. Finally, we search for the possible determinants of total factor
productivity, with special emphasis on variables reflecting trade orientation.
We find that opening the economy to trade benefits total factor productivity. We
capture the opening of the economy to trade through increasing exports to GDP,
improving the terms of trade, and reducing local deviations from purchasing power
parity. Moreover, the stock of human capital contributes to total factor productivity
only after our one measure of openness (i.e., exports to GDP) passes some threshold
level. Before that threshold, increases in human capital actually depress total factor
productivity.
Our convergence results generally conform to the results in the existing
literature. Some new results do emerge regarding our tests for convergence of total
factor productivity. First, we discover stronger evidence of convergence for total factor
productivity than for real GDP per capita, suggesting that technological convergence is
an important phenomenon. Second, we find strong evidence of convergence of total
factor productivity for low- and middle-income countries, and weak evidence of
convergence for high-income countries. These findings support the view that
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technological change is a public and not a private good. New technological innovations
cross country borders, facilitating the convergence of total factor productivity.
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Table 1: Production Function Estimates
________________________________________________________________________
ln y ln y ln y ln y
________________________________________________________________________
ln k    0.4756*    0.4712*    0.3951*    0.4751*
(18.86) (18.64)   (9.38) (18.81)
ln L  -0.0988‡‡  -0.1383‡  -0.1988**  -0.1510‡‡
(-1.32) (-1.78) (-2.39) (-1.40)
ln h    0.1136‡
  (1.81)
ln H ln k    0.0091**
  (2.38)
ln H ln L    0.0025
  (0.67)
time1  -0.1097*  -0.1005*  -0.0936*  -0.1071*
(-3.99) (-3.55) (-3.25) (-3.80)
time2  -0.0339‡  -0.0268‡‡  -0.0224  -0.321‡‡
(-1.66) (-1.30) (-1.08) (-1.56)
time3    0.0316**    0.0360**    0.0379**    0.0326**
  (2.13)   (2.40)   (2.53)   (2.19)
time4    0.0426*    0.0456*    0.0441*    0.0460*
  (3.04)   (3.01)   (2.91)   (3.03)
time5    0.0330‡‡    0.0263    0.0215    0.0312‡‡
  (1.60)   (1.26)   (1.02)   (1.50)
time6    0.0328    0.0195    0.0125    0.0293
  (1.23)   (0.71)   (0.45)   (1.08)
R2    0.7860    0.7872    0.7885    0.7857
SEE    0.1269    0.1266    0.1262    0.1270
________________________________________________________________________
Note: All regressions employ the fixed-effect technique. Each variable is measured as a
deviation from its mean over time, except the 6 time dummy variables (i.e., timei,
i = 1, 2, ..., 6) that capture the fixed effects over time. The variables are defined as
follows: y equals real GDP per worker; k equals the capital stock per worker; L
equals the stock of workers; H equals the stock of human capital; and h equals
the stock of human capital per worker. See the Data Appendix for more details
about the definitions and sources of data. R2 is the adjusted coefficient of
determination and SEE is the standard error of estimation.
* means significant at the 1-percent level.
** means significant at the 5-percent level.
‡ means significant at the 10-percent level.
‡‡ means significant at the 20-percent level.
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Table 2: Real Per Capita GDP and Total Factor Productivity Convergence
________________________________________________________________________
All Countries    Low-       Middle-        High-
Income       Income       Income
          (83)      (22)           (38)            (23)
________________________________________________________________________
b-Convergence: Single Cross-Section:
by      -0.0005   -0.0045     -0.0056     -0.0184**
    (-0.26)  (-0.43)    (-0.61)    (-2.74)
        [81]       [20]        [36]        [21]
btfp      -0.0084*   -0.0087‡‡     -0.0114‡     -0.0212*
    (-3.29)  (-1.68)    (-1.96)    (-4.40)
        [81]       [20]        [36]        [21]
b-Convergence:  Panel Data:
by     -0.0349*   -0.0220‡‡      -0.0375*     -0.0517*
    (-4.55)  (-1.49)     (-3.24)    (-3.03)
      [326]       [82]       [146]        [86]
btfp     -0.0573*   -0.0615*     -0.0572*     -0.0296‡‡
    (-6.47)  (-3.39)    (-4.36)    (-1.65)
      [326]       [82]       [146]        [86]
s-Convergence:
sy
(1960-64)      0.8969    0.4455      0.2934      0.2737
(1965-69)      0.9005    0.4326      0.3038      0.2369
(1970-74)      0.9128    0.4400      0.3414      0.1844
(1975-79)      0.9253    0.4879      0.3446      0.1702
(1980-84)      0.9289    0.5415      0.4073      0.2055
(1985-89)      0.9724    0.6476      0.4752      0.2567
(1960-89)      0.9386    0.5217      0.4267      0.2793
stfp
(1960-64)      0.4446    0.4968      0.3009      0.2957
(1965-69)      0.4342    0.4689      0.2997      0.2866
(1970-74)      0.4281    0.4359      0.3063      0.2580
(1975-79)      0.4291    0.4396      0.3115      0.2446
(1980-84)      0.4251    0.4769      0.3175      0.2174
(1985-89)      0.4342    0.4834      0.3394      0.2124





Note: See Table 1. The bs come from estimating equation (12) and the ss are the
standard deviation of real GDP per worker (y) and total factor productivity (tfp)
as measured by the production function that excludes our measure of human
capital.
* means significant at the 1-percent level.
** means significant at the 5-percent level.
‡ means significant at the 10-percent level.
‡‡ means significant at the 20-percent level.
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Table 3: Total Factor Productivity Regressions
________________________________________________________________________
            ln tfp                           ln tfph             
________________________________________________________________________
ln H    0.0090  -0.0961‡‡  -0.0437‡‡  -0.1357*
  (0.29) (-1.64) (-1.39) (-2.32)
ln x    0.1237*    0.0925*    0.1207*    0.0935*
  (6.08)   (3.70)   (5.97)   (3.76)
ln H ln x    0.0395**    0.0346‡
  (2.12)   (1.87)
ln tot    0.0283‡‡    0.0286‡‡    0.0295‡‡    0.0298‡‡
  (1.38)   (1.40)   (1.45)   (1.46)
ln pd  -0.0703**  -0.0680**  -0.0779**  -0.0882**
(-2.03) (-2.00) (-2.26) (-2.54)
ln (1 + p)  -0.1550*  -0.1560*  -0.1548*  -0.1557*
(-3.78) (-3.82) (-3.79) (-3.83)
sx  -0.0023*  -0.0028*  -0.0024*  -0.0028*
(-3.14) (-3.65) (-3.20) (-3.63)
stot    0.00003    0.00004    0.00003    0.00004
  (0.23)   (0.30)   (0.21)   (0.27)
spd    0.0006‡‡    0.0006‡    0.0006‡    0.0008**
  (1.60)   (1.66)   (1.68)   (1.97)
sp    0.0116‡‡    0.0117‡‡    0.0115‡‡    0.0116‡‡
  (1.33)   (1.35)   (1.33)   (1.34)
time1  -0.1061*  -0.0955*  -0.1123*  -0.1071*
(-6.36) (-5.74) (-6.78) (-6.39)
time2  -0.0336**  -0.0265‡  -0.0369**  -0.0340**
(-2.27) (-1.76) (-2.45) (-2.25)
time3    0.0306**    0.0340**    0.0302**    0.0315**
  (2.27)   (2.54)   (2.26)   (2.37)
time4    0.0515*    0.0490*    0.0548*    0.0594*
  (3.61)   (3.45)   (3.86)   (3.84)
time5    0.0312**    0.0239‡‡    0.0348**    0.0312**
  (2.06)   (1.58)   (2.31)   (2.05)
time6    0.0264‡‡    0.0152    0.0295‡    0.0240‡‡
  (1.53)   (0.88)   (1.71)   (1.38)
R2    0.3040    0.3071    0.2836    0.2880





Note: See Table 1. Results of estimating equation (13) where the dependent variables
are, in turn, the natural logarithm of total factor productivity derived from
production functions that exclude (tfp) and include (tfph) human capital. Other
variables are defined as follows: x equals the ratio of exports to GDP; tot equals
the terms of trade; pd equals the local price deviation from purchasing power
parity; p equals the inflation rate; and sI equals the standard deviation of i = x,
tot, pd, and p over each 5-year sub-period.
* means significant at the 1-percent level.
** means significant at the 5-percent level.
‡ means significant at the 10-percent level.
‡‡ means significant at the 20-percent level.
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Data Appendix:
As noted in the text, the panel data set includes information from 83 countries
over the 1960 to 1989 period. Observations are generally averaged over five year sub-
periods -- 1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, and 1985-89. Thus, the panel
includes 498 observations (83 countries and 6 time periods). The countries included in
the sample were restricted merely by data availability. Table A lists the countries
ranked by their total factor productivity calculated from the production function that
excludes human capital. The Table also lists the ranking of the countries based on the
total factor productivity estimated when human capital was included in the production
function. The rest of this Data Appendix provides more information about the sources
and in some cases estimation of the data.
Physical Capital
Most data on the physical capital stock comes from the Penn World Table 5.6
(PWT5.6). Data for some countries in some years were missing from this table. To
maintain a reasonably large sample, we estimate the capital stock series for some
countries, where either the data on important components of the capital stock are
available, or where data on the total capital stock are available for some years. We
considered the following procedures in estimating the capital stock series.
1. For those countries that do not have capital stock data available for the
beginning of the sample, we choose the steady-state method to estimate missing values.
At the steady state, the capital output ratio (K/Y) is constant. This implies that the rates
of change in capital and output are equal. Furthermore,
dKt = It - d Kt , Þ (dKt/Kt) (Kt/Yt) = (It/Yt) - ( d Kt/Yt).
Since the steady state levels of output and capital grow at the same rate, we have
the following:
(dYt/Yt) (Kt/Yt) = (It/Yt) - ( d Kt/Yt) Þ (gt + d) (Kt/Yt) = (It/Yt).
Thus, solving for the steady-state capital output ratio gives the following:
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 (Kt/Yt)* = (It/Yt)*/(g*t + d),
where "*" refers to steady-state values and d equals 7 percent.
The steady-state growth rate of output (g*) does not equal the actual growth rate
for any country. Rather, as assumed by King and Levine (1994), we use the following
relationship:
g* = l g + (1 - l) gw,
where g is the period-average actual growth rate for the country in question, gw is the
actual world growth rate estimated at 4 percent per year, and l = 0.25, a measure of
mean reversion in the growth rates, following Easterly et al. (1993). This, then produces
the steady-state capital output ratio [(Kt/Yt)*].
Finally, multiplying the steady-state capital output ratio by the average output
for the five-year period yields the average capital stock for the period, and dividing by
the average number of workers for the same period produces the per worker capital
stock.
2. When the capital stock in the initial years is available, we follow the perpetual
inventory method to calculate the capital stock as follows:
Kt = It + (1 - d) Kt-1.
Finally, the estimated numbers are adjusted based on any discrepancy, in the
first year the actual numbers are again available, between the estimated and actual
numbers.
Human Capital
We employ the average educational attainment (years of schooling) for the adult
population, available from the NBER/Barro-Lee (1994) data set.
Terms of Trade
Our main source for export and import prices (and unit values) is International
Financial Statistics (CD-ROM, July 1996, and several yearbook print issues). Various
sources are used to compile the trade price data that are missing from the International
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Financial Statistics (various issues). Some come from the World Bank World Tables
(various issues). The remaining data are compiled, and in some cases estimated based
on information, from United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (various issues),
International Financial Statistics Yearbook (various issues), Direction of Trade Statistics
Yearbook (various issues), and UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade and Development,
(1994).
Many of the estimated numbers resulted from the use of proxies such as unit
values of the commodities or commodity groups that contribute a major share of trade
(e.g., export price of phosphate for Jordan, crude petroleum price for Algeria, and
cotton and coffee prices for Nicaragua); share-weighted average of major trading
partner's import prices (for export prices of the country in question); and export prices
(for import prices) where a county's commodity trade is significantly diversified but
trade is largely concentrated with a small number of countries (e.g., France's import
and export prices proxy Niger's export and import prices for 1959-66, and for the same
period for Trinidad & Tobago the import prices are the import-share-weighted average
of wholesale prices of the United States and the United Kingdom, and export prices of
Venezuela).
Inflation
The chief source of data on inflation is the database for Fischer's World Bank
growth project, contained in the World Bank Growth Database. Inflation rates are
annual percentage changes in the consumer price index. We added the data for 1960
and 1989 from the International Financial Statistics (various issues). For Guinea-Bissau
(1960-87), we use, for lack of better data, the average inflation for Africa; and for Jordan
(1960-67), the average inflation for "Other Middle East." Both of these series come from
the International Financial Statistics Yearbook (various issues). Finally, for seven other
countries for a few years, we used the GDP deflators, again from the International
Financial Statistics Yearbook (various issues).
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Local Price Deviation from Purchasing Power Parity
This variable comes from the PWT5.6. The variable P in PWT5.6 measures the
local price of an identical basket of goods for all countries relative to the price in the
United States. Hence it is a measure of the local price deviation from purchasing power
parity, with the United States as the reference country.
Openness
We use two measures of openness -- the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP
and the ratio of exports to GDP. If exports and imports always move closely together,
then the two measures may provide the same information. Levine and Renelt (1992)
indicate that these two measures provide the same qualitative results in their analysis
of the determinants of growth. We find that exports to GDP performs uniformly better
in our analysis of the determinants of total factor productivity.
The data for exports plus imports to GDP come from the PWT5.6. This data base,
however, does not separate exports from imports. Hence, to generate exports to GDP,
we use International Financial Statistics Yearbooks (various issues) for both exports and
GDP. To fill in some missing export data for some countries in a few years, we use the
Direction of Trade Statistics (various issues), the United Nations Monthly Bulletin of
Statistics (various issues), and the UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade and
Development (1994).
Volatility Measures
We use volatility measures of (1) inflation, (2) terms of trade, (3) local price
deviation from purchasing power parity, (4) exports-plus-imports-to-GDP ratio, and (5)
export-to-GDP ratio. We measure volatility as the standard deviation of a variable for




Country Rank Rank Country Rank Rank
  tfp  tfph   tfp  tfph
____________________________________________________________________________________
United States     1    1 Hong Kong   43   45
Trinidad-Tobago    2    7 Mauritius   44   49
United Kingdom    3    3 Fiji   45   57
France    4    4 Israel   46   55
Bangladesh    5    2 Uganda   47   39
Jordan    6   12 Greece   48   51
Venezuela    7    9 Haiti   49   42
Netherlands    8   13 Turkey   50   41
Argentina    9   11 Syria   51   50
Canada   10   14 Portugal   52   46
Algeria   11    8 South Korea   53   53
Brazil   12    5 Malta   54   63
Iran   13    6 Senegal   55   52
Australia   14   18 Paraguay   56   61
Mexico   15   10 India   57   38
West Germany   16   16 Iceland   58   64
Italy   17   15 Dominican Republic   59   59
New Zealand   18   28 Thailand   60   54
Belgium   19   24 Ghana   61   56
Japan   20   17 Colombia   62   58
Austria   21   22 Philippines   63   60
Sweden   22   27 Peru   64   62
South Africa   23   20 Cyprus   65   66
Uruguay   24   30 Ecuador   66   65
Yugoslavia   25   26 Swaziland   67   69
Spain   26   23 Bolivia   68   67
El Salvador   27   29 Jamaica   69   70
Mozambique   28   19 Panama   70   72
Tunisia   29   25 Botswana   71   71
Denmark   30   36 Papua New Guinea   72   68
Pakistan   31   21 Honduras   73   73
Nicaragua   32   33 Guyana   74   77
Guatemala   33   32 Zambia   75   74
Barbados   34   48 Lesotho   76   78
Chile   35   37 Sri Lanka   77   76
Malaysia   36   34 Malawi   78   75
Singapore   37   40 Kenya   79   79
Ireland   38   43 Niger   80   80
Indonesia   39   31 Togo   81   81
Norway   40   44 Zimbabwe   82   82
Finland   41   47 Guinea-Bissau   83   83





Note: The countries are ranked based on the logarithm of total factor productivity calculated
from the production function specifications that exclude (tfp)and include (tfph) our
measure of human capital. The actual values of the logarithm of total factor
productivity are available on request.
